The k-means clustering is one of the most popular clustering algorithms in data mining. Recently a lot of research has been concentrated on the algorithm when the dataset is divided into multiple parties or when the dataset is too large to be handled by the data owner. In the latter case, usually some servers are hired to perform the task of clustering. The dataset is divided by the data owner among the servers who together perform the k-means and return the cluster labels to the owner. The major challenge in this method is to prevent the servers from gaining substantial information about the actual data of the owner. Several algorithms have been designed in the past that provide cryptographic solutions to perform privacy preserving k-means. We provide a new method to perform k-means over a large set using multiple servers. Our technique avoids heavy cryptographic computations and instead we use a simple randomization technique to preserve the privacy of the data. The k-means computed has exactly the same efficiency and accuracy as the k-means computed over the original dataset without any randomization. We argue that our algorithm is secure against honest but curious and passive adversary.
Introduction
K-means clustering is one of the most widely used techniques in data mining [2, 11, 15, 16, 20] . The K-means clustering algorithm is used to find groups which have not been explicitly labeled in the data. This can be used to confirm business assumptions about what types of groups exist or to identify unknown groups in complex data sets. It has been successfully used in various topics, including market segmentation, computer vision, geostatistics, astronomy and agriculture [6, 27, 29] . k-means clustering is rather easy to implement and apply even on large data sets, particularly when using heuristics such as Lloyd's algorithm. However, sometimes the dataset contains private information that cannot be made available to the party who is computing the k-means for a user [1, 8, 30] . There are times when the data is huge and the data owner does not have the computational capability to do clustering on his own. In our work we deal with this particular case. Another case arising may be a few independent parties contain parts of data on whom clustering has to be performed as a whole [5, 13, 32] . [5] and [13] divide the data horizontally whereas [32] and [9] deal with vertical partitioning of data. The privacy and secrecy considerations can prohibit the parties from sharing their data with each other. The solution should not just be provably secure but should also minimize the additional overheads in terms of communication and computation costs required to introduce privacy. Solutions were sketched in the works cited above to extract knowledge by making the participating parties to compute common functions, without having to actually reveal their individual data to any other party. Such algorithms face a lot of challenges because it is not very easy to reach an optimal point that will provide a perfect balance to security, accuracy and efficiency. One of the most common approaches to solve this issue is using data perturbation to preserve the privacy of the data. Some of the common techniques are using additive noise [18] , multiplicative noise [22] , geometric perturbation, or rotational perturbation [7] , all of which have the "Distance Preservation Property". Some works use Secure Multiparty Computation [28] , and homomorphic encryptions [3, 14] to safeguard the data. But these schemes are generally computationally costly and reduce the performance of the clustering algorithm significantly. The latter approaches provide more protection to the data than the former at the cost of efficiency and sometimes their application becomes practically infeasible. Our setup may be considered similar to [31] in which Upmanyu et al use a shatter function(a function described by Upmanyu et al to divide a value into many secret shares keeping the privacy of the data intact) and the Chinese Remainder theorem [10, 25] to encrypt and reconstruct respectively.They propose a cloud computing based solution that utilizes the services of non-colluding servers. Each of the users, is required to compute the secret shares of its private data using a shatter function. Each share is then sent over to a specific server for processing. The cloud of employed servers, now runs the K-means algorithm using just the secret shares. The protocol ensures that none of the users/servers have sufficient information to reconstruct the original data, thus ensuring privacy.
Our Contribution
We use the concept of outsourcing [21] the data to third parties who will do the computation for the data provider. These third parties are considered as adversarial, hence the data needs to be protected from them. Though [31] is fairly efficient, our protocol is better because we avoid any encryptional overheads and use multiplicative data perturbation. Since our protocol divides the data into parts and every server works in parallel. it boosts the performance in comparison to a single server performing the whole algorithm [33] . We argue that our protocol is secure against attacks on data perturbations because of the introduction of a noise term. Keeping the noise under a certain limit, we have been able to provide a clustering algorithm that has 100% accuracy as the iterative k-means over non-randomized data.
Proposed Solution

Problem Setup
In this section, we shall specify our problem at hand in detail. In our problem, we have one data owner who contains a large dataset D. The dataset contains n data points and each data point has d attributes. All the attributes are considered to be floating point parameters. Hence D can be thought as containing n points in R d . Let these points be labeled as X 1 , X 2 ,...,X n . The data owner wishes to use t servers to compute the k-means. We consider horizontal partitioning of the data in this work. Let m be the number of iterations needed for the k-means to converge and let k represent the number of clusters we want to form. The problem is computing the k-means on the entire dataset securely, efficiently and accurately by dividing the dataset horizontally among the servers without revealing any information about the original data points and any of the attributes to the servers.
Our Protocol
• The data provider generates 2d number of random numbers r i , i ∈ 1, 2, ..., 2d from a set of R that are large enough. A lower bound for the value of r i will be discussed in a further section.
• The data provider selects a small enough ǫ > 0 and then chooses n numbers ǫ i , i ∈ 1, 2, ..., n uniformly from (0, ǫ). They will behave as noise added to the data to improve the security. A detailed analysis of the upper bound of ǫ has been provided later.
• Let us denote X i = (x i1 , x i2 , ..., x id ). Randomize the data by doing the following computation:
Hence the j th attributed of X i is transformed to:
• The data owner then partitions the transformed data horizontally into t-1 parts locally and sends it to t-1 servers, which means the t th server does not receive any data. The work of the t th server shall be to perform certain calculations using the data provided to it by the remaining servers. The details of which shall be discussed below.
The k-mean computation
Initialization Step
The data provider picks k many transformed data points at random. These points will act as the initial cluster centers. These points say, c 1 , c 2 , ..., c k shall be sent to all the t-1 servers who have some part of the transformed data points. 1 
Lloyd's Step
1. Each server computes the Euclidean distance of its share of data from the initial centers and assigns cluster labels to the points locally.
2. Every server finds the number of points alloted to each center among their share of the data. Say for server s i , m ij denote the number of data points belonging to cluster c j . Here i ∈ 1, 2, ..., (t − 1), j ∈ 1, 2, ..., k.
3. Each server computes the sum of the points belonging to each center. Let us denote it by d ij , which denotes the sum of the points belonging to cluster j for server i.
4. Next step involves the generation and sharing of two secret keys x and y among the t-1 servers. For this purpose, the data owner may generate two secure random numbers and transfer it to the t-1 servers alongside the transformed data set that is being transferred. The key sharing will be performed only for the first iteration. From the next iteration onwards we will use a secure hash function to get modified values of x and y for every step. The hash function used will be a common function known to each of the first t-1 servers.
The key generation and hash function will be discussed in detail in Sectio 2.3.
Each server computes
and
for each center j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k and sends it to the t th server.
Server t calculates:
for all the j centers and returns this result to the other servers. This value shall work as the centroid i.e. the new centers for the subsequent iteration of the Lloyd's step. Let the centroid be denoted by ν 1 , ν 2 , ..., ν k .
Re-initialization
Repeat Lloyd's step till convergence. If the new centroids computed are not equal to the centroids computed in the previous iteration, i.e. c 1 , c 2 , ..., c k = ν 1 , ν 2 , ..., ν k , reassign c 1 , c 2 , ..., c k = ν 1 , ν 2 , ..., ν k . These shall be the updated centroid values.
Output
After the iterations are complete, the t-1 servers send the cluster centers and cluster assignments of their share of data to the data provider. The data owner now possesses the cluster labelling of all the data and the final cluster centers. Hence, the algorithm concludes at this step.
Group Key Sharing and Hash Function
As previously mentioned the initial set of x and y will be provided to the t-1 servers by the data provider. Alternatively the t-1 servers may indulge in a group key sharing algorithm to generate the first pair of random numbers [4] . But this would lead to additional computational costs which we are compensating for, by suffering one round of communication cost that is involved in transferring two random numbers from the data owner to servers. For the subsequent iterations, we use a public hash function. This function will take as input the output of the previous iteration and the round number. This will allow only the parties that have access to the group key to generate random numbers using the hash iteratively. An assumption on the hash function is that it should be a one way function, i e. computation of the inverse of the hash function must be a computationally hard problem.
Dynamic Setting
In our protocol, we have only talked about static data. In case, the data provider gets access to more data that it wishes to include in the k-means calculation, the data provider does the randomization as equation (1) over the new data points. The new points will then be partitioned and sent to the servers. These servers will just include these new points during the assignment of clusters and finding of centroids from the subsequent iteration and proceed as before till convergence.
Analysis
In this section, we will be performing a detailed analysis of the correctness of our protocol. We will inspect the accuracy and show how we handle error in our protocol by providing an upper bound for the noise element. Further we will scrutinize our protocol from the security point of view, where we will talk about leakage of information and conclude how such a leakage does not compromise the privacy. Lastly we will provide a brief account of the efficiency of our algorithm.
Correctness
It has been proven that iterative k-means guarantees convergence. Hence our protocol can be deemed correct if we can prove convergence of our algorithm over the transformed data and if we can show that the error involved in clustering the transformed data is acceptable when compared to the clustering of the original data.
Without loss of generalization, we have made the assumption that all data points have non negative attributes. This assumption can be made because all points can easily be translated such that all their coordinates become positive. This is done without distorting the geometry at all, hence it does not affect the clustering algorithm at all.
Necessarily the main operations in the k-means are 1. Find Distance: Computing distance between points and the centroids.
2. Compare Distance: Find which centroid is nearest to a point.
Find new centroid: Re-initialise the centers.
Distance(X 1 , X 2 ):
In order to make our calculations and analysis simpler, the above expression under the root maybe looked upon as a quadratic polynomial in ǫ. Assuming ǫ to be sufficiently small (say≤0.1), the polynomial will be dominated by the lower order and the constant terms, hence the quadratic term of ǫ can be neglected. Thus, the final expression takes the form:
In some places we will use expression (8) instead of (7) and will provide proper justification for its usage. We introduce a term λ where λ = (
shall be considered to be the error terms for (7) and (8) respectively added to the distance due to inclusion of noise. λ is directly proportional to ǫ and the difference in co-ordinates of the two points (X 1 , X 2 ). Given a sufficiently small ǫ, the error can be easily bounded by an acceptable threshold which will be made clearer in the section dealing with the bound of ǫ and r i s. We notice that the distance between the transformed points is nothing but the scaled distance between the original points with some error term added to it.The scaling is done uniformly for all data points. It is evident that k-means converges when the distance between the new and original centroid becomes 0. Expression (6) becomes 0 when x 1i − x 2i = 0, ∀i ∈ 1, ..., d. Given the lower bound of r i s, it will be evident that (8) will become 0 iff the above condition holds. Since our exact distance form is described by (7), (8) becoming 0 implies an error element may prevail in (7) that may not become 0, but we can neglect that error under the above assumption of sufficiently small ǫ. Hence, we can claim that the k-means on the transformed data shall converge at the same time when the k-means on the plain text converges. So, the number of iterations required for convergence is exactly the same.
Lower bound of r i
We need to specify a range of r i s for which the error term involved in the above expression can be acceptable. We can say that the error term will not influence our clustering if it does not alter our Compare Distance method.
for all possible values of i, which means,
Solving the above equation with proper bounds and using equation (10) we get a lower bound for r i s.
, ∀i, j, k
where r=min(r i ), ∀i. Refer to Appendix A.1 for detailed calculation.
Upper Bound on ǫ
The requirement that the term inside the root in expression (8) must be non-negative, gives us an upper bound for ǫ.
A sufficient condition to achieve it is,
If we use (7) as our parent equation then (9) remains unchanged. This is so because expression (7)-λ is greater than (8)-λ. So the using latter provides us a stronger upper bound for ǫ.
Equations (11) and (12) show the bound of one, given the other. Combining the two relations, we will get a common expression for the relation between ǫ and r that shall ensure correctness. Thus if ǫ and r i s lie in this range then the output of Compare Distance function will not be altered for the transformed data. It is guaranteed that assignment of intermediate clusters for the points remain consistent with the assignment without the transformation. That is so because the centroids are found by taking the average over the points in a particular cluster, hence the distance between a centroid and a data point will be less than the global maximum and more than the global minimum as described in the derivation of (11) and (12) respectively. These conditions will ensure that the clustering over the randomized data points is same as the clustering over the original data. This way we ensure a 100% clustering accuracy.
Security
Adversarial Power:
1. Every server tries to gain maximum information about the original data without deviating from the protocol.
2. Every server would like to gain knowledge about the data possessed by the other servers.
3. Servers record and store all intermediate information made available to them and use it to find out more information about the data.
Collusion among servers is not allowed.
Information available to servers 1-(t-1)
1. Randomized data points.
2. Intermediate cluster assignments of their own data only.
3. Intermediate cluster centers 4. Number of iterations needed to converge.
Information available to server t 1. A scaled version of the intermediate centers.
2. Randomized sum of coordinates of the data points that belong to a particular cluster at each iteration.
3. Randomized value for the number of data points belonging to every cluster for each server at every iteration.
4. Randomized value of intermediate centers.
5.
Number of iterations needed to converge.
Security Against Existing Attack Scenarios
The information initially available to the first t-1 servers is of the form of equation (1). Various algebraic methods have been discussed in [19] , [23] and [24] to design attacks on data perturbation. But most of the attacks described so far in the above are applicable for additive noise. Liu et al [23] have spoken in detail from the attackers point of view in terms of security in random perturbation. Their model deals with known sample or known inputoutput models in case of Distance Preserving Transformations. Liu et al [22] in their work talk about attacks on multiplicative data perturbation. Their approach uses Independent Component Analysis to remove the randomization and gain information about the data. Given that Principle Component Analysis works successfully only when the perturbation matrix is orthogonal, so if the transformation is not distance preserving as in our case, PCA is unsuccessful to gain any significant information about the original data. The crux behind all these approaches is based on the fact that distance preserving transformation in a vector space over a real field is an orthogonal transformation. The advantage of our technique is that the data transformation does not preserve the distance hence making the transformation a non orthogonal one. This makes it much more secure than the Distance Preserving transformations. A latest work [17] has designed an attack on Relation Preserving Transformation. RPT is the basis of our transformation which may make it open to breach by [17] . Assuming that such an attack is implemented, we analyse the feasibility of it in detail.
We state a few points that are the salient features for the attack.
It is assumed that the attacker has the knowledge about some original data points and that there exists a third party malicious adversary. The attack reveals which side of the hyperplane does the point lie. No information is found about the exact location of the point. A major assumption is that the search space is discrete. It has been stated that the algorithm is useful for data set that is usually low dimentional. The main basis of a successful attack is that probability of choosing a point inside a bounded area is non negligible which again goes back to the assumption of a discrete search space. As per [17] The attacker has no knowledge about any of the original data and there exists no third party malicious adversary. All communication channels are assumed to be secure and the servers have no information about any data point. We are working with high dimensional data sets where d≥8 usually. The assumption of discretization of the search space reduces effectiveness of the attack algorithm because in most cases we deal with real and floating valued points that can not be treated as discrete.
Giving the adversary the upper hand, consider that instead of real, our data point are fixed point floating values. This lets us treat the search space as discrete. We consider the best case scenario for the attacker and take |K|=2. We provide a A computation with complexity around 2 40 is considered to be easy and around 2 64 is barely feasible with today's computing power.. To compute k-means, we require precision of atleast 3 digit for accuracy. Since we are dealing with large values of d, even in the best case for the attacker where R=10, the complexity can be seen to be much bigger than 2 64 . While dealing with large datasets, it is not a practical assumption that the data points are dispersed over a range of just 10 units. It will be much more than this in most cases and d ≥ 8 in most cases where cloud computing is used. We can safely conclude from the above table that this attack can not be practically implemented whenever the dimension is more than 5 because of the extremely high complexity. Since the attack is exponential in d, the attack becomes extremely inefficient for large and high dimentional data sets making it extremely infeasible to implement in real life.
Security Against Data Leakage
The servers try to remove the randomness from the data they have and retrieve maximum information about the original data. If they take the attribute wise quotient of their data then they have the following:
If the servers wish to use the entire data points instead of the attributes, then the only possible method to proceed will be to compute the generalized inverse [26] by treating the vectors as column matrix. Finding the g-inverse of a point and multiplying it with another data point can be interpreted as a quotient between two vectors. This calculation leads us back to a form of the above expression (13) . So we shift to a probabilistic approach to see if there is some significant leakage of data. We want to ensure that the above expression (13) reveals no significant information about
We assume probability distributions over expression (13) and (14) and proceed to check how similar are these two distributions. If the distributions are not similar then we can successfully claim the expression (13) does not reveal anything non negligible about expression (14) .
We use the Kullback Leibler Divergence function [12] as a metric to compare the two distributions. Kullback Leibler divergence is a bounded function between 0 and 1. The further the value from 0, the less similar are the two distributions. With the help of proper upper and lower bounds, simplification of the divergence functions gives us a lower bound on the metric. Let us denote KD as the output of the divergence function. Then,
Refer Appendix A.2 for details. The definition of Kullback Leibler guarantees the value of (15) to be non negative. Since (15) is an increasing function of ǫ, the greater the value of ǫ, more is the deviation of the function from 0. Hence we can increase ǫ till the upper bounds to ensure that the Kullback Leibler distance moves away from 0. Hence by regulating ǫ, the probability distributions can be made dissimilar.
Let us now talk about the leakage of information to server t. Server t receives information in the form of equations (3) and (4). Its aim again will be to remove the randomization and get information about the original values. It can do the following two divisions to extract out the randomness. Compute
or compute using only (3) (
and do similar with the use of (4) alone. Again using the same techniques as before of assuming probability distributions and find the Kullback Leibler divergence function between the randomized and the non-randomized values, it can be shown that KD for (16) is:
while KD for (17) is:
where z denotes the number of points taken into consideration while computing KD. Thus we see that as long as x and y are not same, the occurence of which has negligible probability as the numbers are being randomly generated then the Kullback Leibler divergence function will give an output that will be away from 0. There is no interaction between servers 1,...,(t-1) other than the key exchange, so a server cannot gain any information about the data of the other servers when collusion is disallowed. The other leakage of information that we compromise with is the number of iterations needed to converge, but we can accommodate this because it does not give up on the privacy of the data which is our primary goal.
Efficiency
While analyzing the performance of our algorithm on the basis of the total communication and computational cost, we mention the complexity of the entire process by dividing it into three different levels, the data provider, the first t-1 servers and the t th server.
Data Provider Computation: The only computation done here is the randomization of the data where the performance cost is dominated by the number of multiplications to be done. Communication: There shall be a one time communication cost required to send the randomized data to the respective servers. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the data provider divides the data set into t-1 parts each of size n 1 , n 2 , ..., n t−1 . The communication cost will depend on the size of the data transferred. In this and all further cases that we discuss, we will deal with the worst case, i.e. we assume that the size of the data is the upper bound for all the possible values. Say this upper bound is U.
Servers 1-(t-1) Computation: The main computations being done here are finding distance and comparing distance before assigning the necessary clusters. Here the operations that dominate the performance are performing squares and doing comparisons to find which cluster a point should belong to. Communication: Sending (3) and (4) to server t uses up some bandwidth. Here consider that all values sent by a server i in the form of (3) and (4) shall have an upper bound N i and M i . This communication cost will be accounted for m number of times where m is the number of iterations needed for the algorithm to converge. (5) uses the division operation that will account for the computational complexity in this case. Communication: Returns k many values of the form (5) to each server m number of times. Assumption is (5) will always be less than C, where C is the upper bound of all values to be returned by server t.
Server t Computation: Computing
Comparison with [31] Since our model is closest to the one proposed by Upmanyu et al, it is fair to compare the efficiency of both the algorithms. Instead of using 3 layers of interaction like us, they use only 2 levels of interaction. Their communication cost for sending data from data owner to servers is same as ours because they have to send secrets shares of each data point to the servers similar to our sharing of data points to servers. Computationally, our algorithm beats them because of the following. i) In [31] , the data owner needs to shatter the data points leading to performing t modulos for each data point. Hence, nt modulos are to be performed in O(nt), whose computation cost is similar to inversion that is heavier than multiplication. ii) At the server level, in order to assign clusters, the servers need to merge their share of secret together and then proceed with distance computation and comparision. This process in whole involves two main operations, sharing common secret keys using group key sharing and merging the shared secrets. The merging operation uses Chinese Remainder Theorem, which has a complexity of O(N 2 ). Repeating this for all n data points and for m may rounds makes the complexity O(nN 2 m) which is not linear. In addition to this, we have already talked about the inefficiency of a group key sharing algorithm. We see that the amount of computations to be done by [31] is much heavier than in our case. We summarize in the table below, the comparison between computation cost of the two algorithms. 
Our Algorithm
Performance Comparison with locally computed k-means by the Data Provider
If the data provider did not outsource to compute k-means and instead did the entire process on his own, the complexity would be O(nkdm). The performance would be dominated by multiplications and inversions. Whenever the number of clusters to be formed becomes large, the efficiency would be effected. By outsourcing, one will also be relieved of performing numerous inversions and comparisons that will be taken care of by the servers. Moreover, along with time complexity, another constraint might be space complexity as well. If the entire algorithm is performed locally, then the data owner needs storage space in order to keep all the intermediate information recorded at every round of iteration. In this case, all the data provider needs is storage for the data set for only one round.
Choice of Parameters for Practical Implementation
A significant amount of computation is required to preprocess the data for randomization. The first step is selecting values of r i and ǫ. Following equation (11) to find value of r shall take O(n 3 ) many inversions. This would hurt our claim for having a very efficient algorithm. We have found a way out of this problem by finding another way of choosing the parameters. Instead of using the strict bound that we have derived in equations (11) and (12), we use a weaker bound. From equation (11) we have,
, ∀i, j, k.
Note that,
Since equation (11) gives the range for correctness, r > − 1 2 retains correctness. From equation (12), we have,
Since we are dealing with only positive values of ǫ, we can choose any non negative real number w. Then choose r > w and ǫ < w 2 .
This process helps us get the value of the parameters in O(1). The next step would be performing multiplications to randomize the data. Our aim is to optimize security and efficiency. We use the bit length of r i and ǫ i to analyse the efficiency and the security. The efficiency is dominated by the multiplications to be performed. Multiplying two numbers of l-bits has a complexity of O(l 2 ). Total nd many multiplications are needed to be performed that will be a complexity of O(ndl 2 ). Let the bit length of the maximum value of r i be l 1 and that of the maximum value of ǫ i be l 2 . We assume that our algorithm is secure if the adversary cannot guess the random numbers with probability more that 2 −80 . We analyse the security of two expressions. In the first, the adversary needs to guess two values of r i s and one value of ǫ i to get to know about one of the coordinates of a data point from the following expression X ′ i = ((r 1 + ǫ i ) * x i1 + r 2 , (r 3 + ǫ i ) * x i2 + r 4 , ..., (r 2d−1 + ǫ i ) * x id + r 2d ). For the second case, the adversary has to guess one value of r i and three values of ǫ i s with non negligible probability from the following equation In the following table we demonstrate some plausible values of l 1 , l 2 that will optimize security along with correctness. The way of choosing l 1 and l 2 has been talked about in details in Appendix B. We consider n= 2 16 and d=2 4 . One assumption is that l 1 > l 2 as we do not want the noise to surpass the scaling factor. l 1 l 2 Probability of guessing (1) Probability of guessing (13) 
Conclusion
In this work, we propose a solution to perform cloiud-based k-means clustering for the multiserver model. The main aim was to perform clustering as efficiently as possible without compromising with the privacy of the data. We have provided a technique that is easy to understand and implement along with being robust. In our work, we have scrutinized the correctness and security of the algorithm to very minute details.
Our method is secure against a passive adversary. Our method is very efficient as it does not include computation overheads due to encryption. The k-means process we have described is similar to the iterative k-means used over original data set. Hence the efficiency of both the algorithms is comparable. The bottle neck in our algorithm is the group key sharing stage, which we have dealt with successfully using a hash function.
With our algorithm we have successfully computed k-means with 100% accuracy when compared with the k-means over the plain text. < B Range of bit length of the parameters.
Probability of correctly guessing the random numbers from equation (1) is comupted as follows. Choosing 2 r i s randomly from 2d many r i 's can be done in 2d 2 ways. Similarly choosing 1 ǫ i from n many ǫ i 's can be done in n ways. Hence the probability is:
Similarly,the probability of correctly guessing from equation (13) is:
Fixing n and d as chosen, for the probability to be less than 2 −80 , the following two equations must be satisfied, 2l 1 + l 2 ≥ 103 (24) and
Hence the above two equations give us the range for the bit length of the parameters. All symbols have the same meaning as described before in the work.
